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We present a theoretical model in tourism economics, assuming that the market for 
tourism is an oligopoly with differentiated products. Destinations (i.e., countries, 
regions, sites or even firms) can invest in order to improve their carrying capacity that 
can be interpreted as the stock of physical, natural or cultural resources. Tourism flows 
yield current revenues, but they are usually detrimental for the cultural or natural 
resource stock over time. We find the solution of the dynamic model, and in particular 
we find the open-loop Nash equilibrium of the game among the destinations, under 
alternative settings, depending on whether the arrivals are exogenous or endogenous, 
and depending on whether the degree of differentiation among destinations is 
exogenous or endogenous. The model is rather general, and it can provide answers to 
different specific questions, like the choice between mass- vs. elite-tourism 
development strategies; the effect of the number of competing products upon profits; 
the optimal degree of product differentiation. 
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In this paper we take a microeconomic perspective, and in particular an "industrial
organization" perspective, in order to study the optimal behavior of destinations, as
concerns investment and tourism flow regulation over time. When we use the word
"destination" we do not intend to necessarily refer to specific local sites, but countries, or
regions, could be the appropriate level of analysis as well.
We assume that the market of tourism is an oligopoly, where differentiated
products are supplied. The fact that the tourist goods are differentiated is, to some extent,
obvious: not only different types of tourism do exist (e.g., sea-side or mountain resort
tourism, cultural tourism, …), but tourist products are clearly differentiated even within
the same type: the sea-side resort tourism in Bali is different from the sea-side resort
tourism in Italy (and also, the sea-side resorts in Sicily are different from that in Sardinia!).
It is more important to discuss why we believe that the market is an oligopoly. Three
points are worth stressing: first, the available tourist destinations are a given (though
large) number, and the entry of new "suppliers" is costly; second, the number of the
organizers of tourism flows (like the tour operators) is limited; third, some interaction
among the destinations is present indeed: the choice of Italian firms (or Italian policy-
makers) concerning the tourist product clearly affects the optimal behavior of any other
firms and policy-makers in that field over the world. For these reasons we believe that the
differentiated oligopoly model is the appropriate tool to investigate the behavior in the
tourism market. The literature developed by industrial organization about the optimal
behavior of firms and policy-makers in market with differentiated products can be useful
for tourism economics; to our knowledge, the available literature has overlooked this
approach so far.
Of course, the tourism products present some specificity to be taken into account.
The tourism flows are necessary to give revenues; however, they usually have detrimental
effects on the carrying capacity of the destination, that is, its natural and physical2
resources, as well as its cultural heritage. The carrying capacity, in turn, affects the
consumer reservation price: the higher the carrying capacity is, the higher is the
reservation price, ceteris paribus.1 Moreover, the carrying capacity can be improved
through appropriate investments: more precisely, costly appropriate investments can be
useful to contrast the depletion entailed by tourism flows over time. For these reasons, we
believe that a dynamic approach is necessary.
In particular, we take a differential game approach to study the investment efforts
over time, made by tourist destinations, under alternative settings, according to whether
tourism flows are choice variables for countries or not, and according to whether the
degree of substitutability between different tourism goods is exogenous or it can be
influenced by destinations. We find the open-loop Nash equilibrium of the differential
game among the destinations, and we focus on the steady-state allocations.
Our model is rather general and it can deal with different points. Three questions
are specifically answered within our framework: (i) is it always convenient to develop an
elite-tourism strategy rather than a mass-tourism strategy?; (ii) is it always convenient for
a system to introduce new products (provided that its introduction costs are negligible)?;
(iii) is it always convenient to increase the product differentiation?
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates the basic setup, and in
particular the demand side. Section 3 investigates the case where the tourism flows are
given, and the only choice variable of a tourism site is the amount of investment aimed at
increasing its carrying capacity over time, and thus aimed at increasing consumers'
reservation price. In a short digression (Section 3.1) we analyze the case that price is fixed
(instead of the tourism flow), so that the possible increase of carrying capacity translates
into an increase of the tourism flow instead of an increase of price. The digression allows
us to derive some conclusions on whether a tourism development strategy based on fixed-
presence is preferable with respect to a fixed-price/mass-tourism strategy. Section 4 takes
into account the possibility that the tourist flows over time are one of the choice variables
of the sites.  In a short digression (Section 4.1) we focus on the effect of the number of
competitors upon the individual and aggregate profits. Section 5 briefly discusses the case
                                                          
1 This simply derives from the usual properties according to which the "quality" of the tourism product is proportional
to the ratio of tourists over the stock of resources, and the price is directly linked with the quality, as suggested, e.g., by
Lanza and Pigliaru (1994).3
where investments aimed at affecting the degree of substitutability among tourism goods
are possible. Section 6 gathers the conclusions.
2.  The basics of the model
We consider the tourism market as an oligopoly under full information condition. At any
time  () +∞ ∈ , 0 t , each destination i ( i=1,2,…,n) offers a tourism product, which is
differentiated with respect to the production of different destinations. Let xi(t) the tourists’
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Equation (1), firstly introduced by Bowley (1924), is widely used in industrial organization
theory (see, e.g., Spence, 1976, Dixit, 1979, Singh and Vives, 1984). Parameter B>0 captures
the sensitivity of the price of variety i to the quantity i. Parameter D, 0<D<B, captures the
sensitivity of price of variety i to the quantity of goods of different variety; this means that
parameter  D captures the degree of substitutability between any pair of varieties: the
lower is D, the less substitutable (i.e., more differentiated) are goods; in the limiting case
D=B the varieties are perfectly substitutable (i.e., goods are homogeneous), and the
homogeneous oligopoly case establishes; in the opposite limiting case, D=0, the
differentiation is the largest, products are totally independent, and each supplier behaves
as a monopolist.
In the available models, A is parameter capturing the market size or the highest
reservation price. In this model we consider Ai(t) as a variable rather than as a parameter.2
We assume that the highest reservation price (or market size) for variety i is directly linked
to the stock of its physical and natural resources, or to the stock of its cultural heritage, in a
word, with its carrying capacity. This capacity vary over time, for three reasons: (i) the size
of tourism flows, that is, the tourists' presence, x, have an impact on the stocks; (ii) the
                                                          
2 This line has been already followed by Cellini and Lambertini (2002), that consider the case that market size
can be enlarged through investment in advertising campaigns.4
amount of investment aimed at protecting environment (or heritage), k, have a positive
impact; (iii) a proportional natural depreciation (or even a proportional natural
regeneration) may occur at the rate δ . Hence, we assume that the dynamics of variable
Ai(t) is described by the following equation:
(2)  ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
) (
t A t k t x t A
dt
t dA
i i i i
i δ α − + − = ≡
•
.
Notice that if  0 > δ , a depreciation occurs (this could well be the case of cultural heritage);
if 0 < δ the stock grows naturally (like in the case of environmental regeneration). In the
remainder of the paper, we assume  0 > δ , but the model can be easily discussed under the
alternative hypothesis. Similarly, the tourism flow x may exert a positive or negative effect
on the product quality and hence on the carrying capacity, according to whether  0 < α , or
0 > α  respectively. In the remainder of the paper we assume  1 = α , so that the case of the
detrimental effect is posted; however, the model can be easily studied under the opposite
case that tourism flow is beneficial to the carrying capacity of destination.
We assume that the investment ki entails a quadratic cost, captured by function ϕ :
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which means that the marginal productivity of ki is decreasing. We also assume that the
tourists' presence in destination i, xi, entails a production cost, according to the generic
function  . 0 (.) ' , )) ( ( > c t x c i Hence, the profit for destination i at time t is:
(4)    2 / )] ( [ )) ( ( ) ( ) ( ) (
2 t k z t x c t x t P t i i i i i ⋅ − − ⋅ = π .
We assume that the objective of each destination is to achieve the maximum present
value of the flows of its profits over time:








where  0 > ρ is the discounting rate, assumed to be equal across the destinations'
population. The dynamic problem is subject to the constraint (2) and to the initial
conditions  {}
n
i i i A A 1 0 ) 0 ( = = . We solve the problem  in three different settings, with
increasing complexity.
(i)  We assume that the dynamics of tourism flows are exogenous, for any destinations:
this means that the dynamics of variables xi(t), i=1,2,…n, are given, and the control
variable for destination i is ki(t) only; the state variable is Ai(t). In this simple case,
analyzed in Section 3, there is no strategic interaction among destinations, and the
problem is a straight optimum control problem.
(ii)  We assume that each destination can control its tourists' presence in any time.
Consequently, the problem faced by destination i has two control variables, xi(t)
and  ki(t), and one state variable, Ai(t); moreover, strategic interaction among
destinations is present, since the presence in destination j affect the profit -and
hence the optimal choice- of destination i. In this case, a differential game has to be
solved. We adopt the open-loop Nash equilibrium as the solution concept, but in
this case it coincides with the closed-loop memoryless Nash equilibrium, which is
strongly time consistent.
(iii)  We assume that the degree of differentiation, D, is a variable rather than a
parameter, and it is possible to affect its value through costly investment, h,
decided by destinations. In this case, a differential game arises, in which each
destination faces a problem with three control variables, ki(t), x i(t), hi(t), and two
state variables, Ai(t) and Di(t). In this case, the open-loop Nash equilibrium differs
from the closed-loop equilibrium and it is only weakly time-consistent.
3. Investment in protecting the environment in the presence of exogenous tourism flows
In this section we take into account the simple case that the destinations can not affect the
tourism flows, i.e., variables xi(t) are exogenous; more specifically, we assume that xi are
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The control variable is ki(t),  and the state variable is A i(t). The corresponding Hamiltonian
function  is
(7)    []
t
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where  ) (t i λ is the current-value co-state variable associated to the state variable.
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and the second condition of system (8) respectively imply:
(9) z t t k i i / ) ( ) ( λ =
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Differentiating eq. (9) with respect to time, and then substituting eq. (10), we obtain:
(11)  ) ( ) ( / / ) ( ) ( / ) ( t k z x z t t k dt t dk i i i i i δ ρ λ + + − = = ≡
• •
.
The simultaneous consideration of (11) and (2) describes the dynamic system under








































































Notice that the motion equation are of type:
(12')
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Provided that xi is constant over time, it is easy to verify that a steady state does exist
( 0 ) ( ) ( = =
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Obvious parameter restrictions are required in order to have economically meaningful
steady-state values. In particular, under the restriction  0 , 1 ) ( 0 > < + < δ δ ρ z  pertaining to
the case of resources depreciation, we have Ai*>0, ki*>0. The graphical representation of
the system under these restrictions is provided by Figure 1.3
Figure 1.
From the study of matrix Ω, it is immediate to notice that the steady state, in the
case under the above mentioned parameter restrictions, is a saddle, as long as:
0 ) det(
2 < − − = Ω ρδ δ  and 0 ) ( > = Ω ρ tr . The stable branch coincides with the horizontal
line ki=ki*.
                                                          
3 The extension to the more general case that  () +∞ ∞ − ∈ , α  is very simple. When α  i n  e q .  ( 2 )  i s  n o t
necessarily equal to 1, the steady state is:  )] ( /[ * δ ρ + = z x k i i ,  )] ( /[ )] ( 1 [ * δ ρ δ δ ρ α + + − = z z x A i i .8
Let us focus on the steady-state point. Both the investment efforts and the size of
resources stock depend positively on the parameter xi, which measures the size of tourism
flow. The corresponding steady-state profit is:
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Comparative statics exercises can be made, as parameter xi changes. The larger is xi,
the larger are ki* and Ai*.4 More interestingly, notice that the parameter xi, has a non-
monotonic effect on the (steady-state) profit of destination i. Moreover, for any given level
of xi, parameter D (and the sum of xj alike) has a negative effect on the profit of destination
i. Verbally, the stronger is the product differentiation (i.e., the lower is parameter D), the
higher the steady-state profit is. Finally, and rather trivially, the larger are the tourism
flows in competing destinations, the lower the steady-state profit is in any given
destination, ceteris paribus.
3.1 A digression: the fixed-price case
In the previous case, the increase of the carrying capacity of the destination translates into
an increase of the price paid by tourists, given that tourism flows are constant by
hypothesis. The opposite case, however, is equally possible: we can imagine that prices are
constant parameters, and the modification of carrying capacity translates into a
modification of tourism flow (see figure 2). Roughly speaking, the former case
corresponds to the situation where tourism flow is constant over time and the increasing
carry-capacity translates into higher price; this is the case of a development strategy that
we can label as "elite"-tourism. The latter case, on the contrary, corresponds to a strategy
recalling the mass-tourism: the increase of carrying capacity translates into a larger
presence of tourists, and price remains constant over time. The model allows verifying that
                                                          
4 As a consequence of a modification of parameter xi, and in the absence of adjustment cost concerning ki(t),
a jump of variable ki(t) allows the dynamic system to jump from the "old" to the "new" horizontal stable
branch.9
the parameter configuration determines which case is more convenient, in terms of
(steady-state) profit.
Figure 2.
In the fixed-price case, it is convenient to deal with direct demand function. The
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where n denotes the number of destinations. (Notice that the limit case D=B describes the
homogeneous oligopoly model, and the individual demand functions are indeterminate,
as it is well-known from the Bertrand model). Let pi be the constant value of price in
destination i. For the sake of analytical simplicity, we also assume that marginal costs of
production are constant,  0 ' / ) ( > = ∂ ∂ i i i c x x c . The dynamic problem of destination i (with ki



























n D B z
c p
k




) ( )] 2 ( [
) (
'
)] 1 ( [ 1
1
*





Straightforward substitutions lead to the steady-state profit.
We are interested in comparing the steady-state allocations and profits under the
two alternative settings, i.e., the fixed-presence ("elite"-development) case and the fixed-
price ("mass"-development) case.
First of all, it is worth noticing that marginal cost of production enters the steady-
state levels of variables only in the case of the "mass"-tourism development strategy: this is
obvious, given that the increase in the amount of presence entails, in this case, increasing
                                                          
5 See Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002,Appendix) for the analytical derivation.10
production cost. Of course, the marginal cost c'i has to be sufficiently small in order to
have meaningful solutions for the problem in this case.6 In other words, the marginal cost
of production represents a constraint which can be severe in the case of "mass-torusim"
development strategy: high marginal cost can prevent the possibility of mass-development
strategy.
Secondly, steady-state profits depend on a number of parameters, and the
parameter configuration determines whether the "elite" development leads to a larger
steady-state profit as compared to the "mass" development. Both cases are, in principle,
possible;7 this means that, under some parameter configurations, mass tourism (if
possible) can lead to higher profit as compared to elite tourism. Moreover, appropriate
shocks on parameter may cause a "switch" as concerns the more convenient development
strategy. This observation may explain why destinations change their tourism
development strategy, moving from "elite" destination to "mass" destination (or vice
versa).
4. The optimal plans when tourism flows are endogenously set by destinations
Now we take into account the case that the tourism flows are neither exogenously given
(nor constant over time), but they are choice variables of destinations. This is to some
extent realistic, as long as destinations can choose different policies as concerns the size of
admissible tourists. In such a case, the Hamiltonian function associated to the dynamic
problem of destination i is still eq. (7), but xi(t) is a control variable for player i, as well as
xj(t) is a control variable of player j. Strategic interaction is indeed present and we are
facing a differential game, as long as Ai (and any Aj alike) moves over time. The law
describing the dynamics of Ai(t) is still eq. (2), and the market demand is still eq. (1).
                                                          
6 It is immediate to see that c'i<pi must hold, for having ki>0; if marginal costs are increasing (instead of constant) they
must be limited from above.
7 In general, parameters interact in a very complex way, and it is difficult to find clear-cut comparative statics
conclusions. However, numerical simulations are easy to compute. Just to give an examples,  set z=1, B=4, D=.5,
n=5,  02 . = = δ ρ , c'i=.1; moreover,  pi=2, ∑ = 4 j p  and  0 3 ∑ = j x . The steady state profit under the fixed-
p r e s e n c e  c a s e  t u r n s  o u t  t o  b e  . 1 1 ,  w h i c h  i s  l a r g e r  than the steady-state profit under the fixed presence
development strategy, for 0<xi<.04. Of course, and rather trivially, the given level of fixed presence (as well
as the given value of fixed price) are relevant parameters for determining the more convenient development
strategy.11
Different solution concepts for differential games are available in literature.  We
focus on the open-loop Nash equilibrium. Under this solution concept, players precommit
their decisions on the control variables to a given time path: they design the optimal plan
at the initial time and then stick to it forever. Differently, under the closed-loop solution
concept, players do not precommit on any path and their decisions at any instant t depend
on all the preceding history, and specifically on the observable value of the state variable
at that instant. The closed-loop solution is strongly time consistent and therefore sub-game
perfect, while the open-loop solution is generally not time-consistent.8 In the case of the
present section, however, the open-loop Nash equilibrium coincides with the closed-loop
Nash equilibrium and it is therefore strongly time-consistent (see also below, footnote 9).
The first order conditions and the adjoint equations pertaining to player i, when xi
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The three conditions of system (15) imply, respectively:
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8 Another strongly time-consistent (and therefore subgame perfect) solution concept is the feedback equilibrium using
Bellman’s equation. For a clear exposition of the difference among these equilibrium solutions see Basar and Olsder
(1982, pp. 318-327, and chapter 6, in particular Proposition 6.1). There exist classes of games where the closed-loop
and the open-loop solutions coincide (see Mehlmann, 1988, ch. 4; Reinganum, 1982; Fershtman, 1987; Fershtman,
Kamien and Muller, 1992; Dockner, Jørgensen, Van Long and Sorger, 2000, ch. 7, Cellini and Lambertini, 2001).
9 We have not inserted the dynamics of state variables Aj, j≠i, in the problem if player i, since it is immaterial to the
solution: it is true that Aj represent state variables also for player i, but Aj does not affect the optimal value of the control
variables of player i. Technically, the game has "separated dynamics". This property entails that the open-loop Nash
equilibrium coincides, in the present case, with the closed-loop equilibrium, since there is no feedback from the state
variable pertaining to a player to the control variables of the other players (see also Cellini and Lambertini, 2001, for
further details in a similar game).12
(18) ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( t t x t i i i λ δ ρ λ + + − =
•
From equation (16) we can obtain the reaction curve, which links xi with the sum of xj.
Then, we impose the symmetry condition xi=xj=x ∀i,j, so that  x n x
i j j ) 1 ( − = ∑ ≠ . Similarly,
we assume Ai=Aj=A, ki=kj=k, ∀i,j. Thus, the equilibrium under symmetry condition turns
out to imply:
(19) ) ( )) ( ( ' ) ( )] 1 ( 2 [ ) ( t zk t x c t x n D B t A + = − + −
Intuitively, the left-hand side of equation (19) can be interpreted as the marginal revenue
from the tourism presence, while the right-hand side represents the marginal cost, taking
into account that the tourism flows generate damages to the natural resources stock that
must be paid (according to addendum zk(t)).
Differentiate eq. (19) and eq. (17) w.r.t. time, and consider them along with eq. (18)
and (2); in the resulting dynamic system , the relevant variables are x(t), k(t), A(t).
It is easy to find the steady state of such a system. Condition  0 ) ( =
•
t A implies
δ / ) ( x k A − = ; condition  0 ) ( =
•
t k  implies  )] ( /[ δ ρ + = z x k ; moreover,  0 ) ( ) ( = =
• •
t k t A imply
0 ) ( =
•
t x ;  substituting these values into equation (19) we obtain:
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Eq. (20) gives the steady-state value of variable x. Also in this case we can offer an intuitive
explanation for the optimality condition (20): it requires to equate the marginal cost of
tourism flow (the right-hand side) with the marginal revenue from tourism (the left-hand
side). However, a relevant problem is present in the steady-state solution of the problem at
hand, as compared to a standard static problem: a larger tourism flow, x, requires a larger
k in steady state (ceteris paribus); this -in turn- may imply a larger market size, A. The
steady-state market size, hence, is positively related to the steady-state quantity of good x.
Consequently, the marginal revenue is not necessarily a decreasing function of the sold13
quantity. Put differently, the first order condition (20) is not necessarily associated to a
maximum point, but it could be associated to a minimum point, the maximum being a
corner solution (if it exists). This issue is well-known in similar problems in environmental
economics.10 A complete study of the second order condition is required. Alternatively, we
can compare the marginal revenue function with the marginal cost function. The
intersection is a maximum (that is, condition (20) identifies the tourist flow associated with
the maximum profit), if and only if the slope of the marginal revenue function is smaller
(algebraically) than the slope of the marginal cost function. Hence different cases must be
considered as concerns the optimum condition (20).
(a)  If 
) (
) ( 1








n D B , the marginal revenue is decreasing and non-positive
for any positive value of x. Consequently, the corner solution x=0 is the optimum.
(b)  If 
) (
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n D B , the marginal revenue is positive, and the intersection
between the marginal revenue curve and the marginal cost curve represents the
maxim profit point iff the marginal cost curve intersect the marginal revenue curve
from below. Hence, we distinguish three sub-cases:
(b.1) if c'(x) is constant, i.e., c'(x)=c'>0,  the optimum is  +∞ → x ; 11
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(b.3) if  c'(x) is a positive, increasing and convex function of x (so that c"(x)>0 and
c"'(x)>0) the interior solution identified by eq. (20) is a maximum profit point if
                                                          
10 See, for instance, the antipollution policy problem  by Forster (1980), as it is presented by Chiang (1992).
11 This is due to the fact that  the marginal revenue increases at a speeder pace than the marginal cost, as x increases.
Unless some capacity constraint on the tourism flows is operative, x<x
^ (when the optimum is the corner solution x=x
^),
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otherwise, the point identifies a minimum.
In sum, the dynamic problem can lead to a steady state with a positive and finite
value for x, only under condition (21) in case (b3). We focus on this case. We are interested
in some comparative statics on the equilibrium steady-state allocation. To this end, let us
consider eq. (20) as an implicit function g(.)=0:
(22) 0
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We can apply to (22) the implicit function theorem, in order to study how the
















































































Just to have an explicit solution, consider the particular case where the marginal
cost is the increasing and convex function c'(x)=cx2, c>0, so that the cost function (apart
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It is immediate to verify that the comparative statics properties outlined by (23) hold in the
particular case of  (24); moreover, in this case,  0 / < ∂ ∂ c x .15
The economic meaning of these properties is easily explained: (i) the larger is the
number of destinations competing with substitutable products, n, the smaller the steady-
state individual production of each destination in the symmetric Nash equilibrium is. (ii)
The larger is B (ceteris paribus), the smaller the marginal revenue, and hence the smaller
the optimal amount of sold product. (iii) The larger is D the less differentiated are the
products: competition among destinations is harsher and the marginal revenues are lower:
this leads to a smaller optimal production. (iv) The higher is the investment cost in
protecting the natural stock (connected with parameter z), the smaller the optimal amount
is of tourists' presence.
As a last remark, we note that, in the case of the present section, the closed-loop
Nash equilibrium collapses into the open-loop: the latter is therefore strongly time
consistent. This is due to the fact that there is no feedback from the current value of state
variables to the current value of control variables, so that the possibility of changing the
choice during the time where the game takes place is pointless.
4.1 A digression: the effect of the number of products
The model can easily provide an answer to a simple question: is it always convenient –for
the system of destinations– to introduce new products? Just to give a real and up-to-date
example, let us think of the debate among Italian and Croatian Adriatic destinations
concerning the convenience of offering a "new package" (i.e., a new destination) of
integrated stay in Italy and Croatia. We can assume that the introduction cost of this
destination is negligible, so that we can simply study how the (steady-state) aggregate
profits depends on n.
It is easy to check that the maximum profit (in steady state) for the system of the
destinations is not a monotonic function of the number of products. Indeed, focussing on
the steady-state profit (under the hypothesis of an interior solution), it is immediate to find
that the aggregate profits,  π n = Π is a function of degree 4 in n. In fact, n affects
(negatively) the individual optimal production, x, and consequently the production cost
c(x) and the investment efforts in carrying capacity, k, and the reservation price A; the
effect on price is not clearcut as long as steady-state levels of both A and x depend16
negatively on n. Hence, it is not surprising that the aggregate profits are not necessarily
increasing in the number of products. Put differently, we can state that an increase of the
number of products, even if it is costless, does not necessarily lead to a larger aggregate
profit.12
From the policy-making perspective, the introduction of a new product within the
Adriatic tourism, affects the equilibrium values of investment in carrying capacity, the
reservation prices of tourists, the optimal quantities and prices; the dimension of such
effects are rather complicate to compute, and no simple recommendation is possible in this
case. Moreover, as a note of caution on this consideration, remember that in this model the
number of products coincides with the number of destination, and the focus is only on the
steady state of the symmetric equilibrium.
5. Investing in product differentiation
Now we sketch the optimal solution in the case that destinations can invest in order
to increase the product differentiation. To this end, remember that, up to now, we
considered D as a parameter, capturing the degree of differentiation between any pair of
tourism products. Strictly speaking, D is a parameter connected with the consumer
preferences, but we can guess that it reflects the fact that destinations are objectively
differentiated, thanks to difference in natural resources, history, tradition, and so on.
To some extent, however, the differentiation may be modified, by appropriate
investment efforts by part of destinations, for instance through advertising efforts. In this
respect, the degree of differentiation becomes a state variable, which is affected -at least in
part- by appropriate investment. Thus, in this Section we treat D as a variable moving over
time, as a result of investment efforts. Notice, however, that D is common to all
destinations, since D denotes the symmetric degree of differentiation among products. In
this respect, D is a public good.
                                                          
12 Just to give a numerical example, if we set z=.1, B=1, D=.5, 02 . = = δ ρ , c=1,  the steady state optimal production
is xi=(24397-n)/2 and the aggregate profits are  12 / ) 15775 ( ) 24397 (
2 n n n n i − − = π  which are increasing in n
over the interval 1<n<5075 and decreasing over 5075<n<15775.17
We assume that, at the initial instant t=0, it is D(0)=D0, with  0<D0<B. (If D0=B
destinations offer the same homogeneous good.) Product differentiation may increase, i.e.,
parameter  D may decrease, through appropriate investments, hi, according to the
























The dynamic equation (25) can be interpreted as a production function whose output is a
decrease in D(t), obtained through appropriate investments. It is immediate to check that
this technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale w.r.t. ∑ =
n
i i t h
1 ) ( . As a result, D(t) is non-
increasing over time, and approaches zero as ∑ =
n
i i t h
1 ) (  tends to infinity. When D(t)=0,
increasing differentiation is no longer possible. (Of course, we are aware that it could be
questionable that investment ki affecting the size of the resources stock, on the one side,
and investment hi affecting the differentiation among destinations, on the other side, are
different variables: in the real world, it is likely that the investment affecting the natural
resources stock also affect the perceived product differentiation.)
Given the symmetric nature of product differentiation in this model, there exists a
complete spillover effect in investment process: just to give a trivial example, when Las
Vegas invests in order to offer a more and more differentiated product, any other site over
the world becomes more and more differentiated with respect to Las Vegas! Notice that
the externality effect we consider here entails that the outcome of investment activity is
public domain via the demand function. On the contrary, the externality effects usually
considered in the literature are associated with information leakage or transmission (see,
inter alia, d'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988).
We assume that the cost of the investment effort in differentiation obeys the linear
equation  . 0 ), ( )) ( ( > ⋅ = w t h w t h w i i  Hence, the individual problem faced by destination i is:
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The control variables in this problem are xi(t), ki(t), hi(t), while Ai(t) and D(t), are the state
variables. Let  ) (t η  be the current-value co-state variable associated with D(t). The
construction of the Hamiltonian function Hi is as usual.
Notice that D(t) is common to all players, and the effort for investment in
differentiation made by j-site directly affects the objective function of the i-site through a
relevant state-variable. For this reason, the open-loop Nash equilibrium does not coincide
with the closed-loop one, in this case: the control variable of player j directly affects the
state variable pertaining to different players, that -in turn- affect the optimal choice
regarding their control variables. We present here only the open-loop solution, that is, we
assume that each site chooses the plan of its actions at the initial time, and then stick to it
forever. We are aware that the solution is only weakly time consistent, as long as each site
would find it optimal to change its plan, if the implementation of the plans by part of
competing sites were observed over time. However, the analytical closed-loop solution is,
in this case, rather difficult to be found, and it requires strict conditions on parameter in
order to exist. (See Cellini and Lambertini (2002b) for the closed-loop solution of a similar -
though simpler- problem, and the comparison with the open-loop solution).
The first order conditions and adjoint equations pertaining to xi(t), ki(t) and Ai(t) are
the same as (16), (17) and (18), apart from the fact that D has to be interpreted a variable
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Equation (27) can be solved under the symmetry assumption hi(t)=hj(t)=h,  ∀i,j,
(along with similar symmetry assumptions concerning x and k) and a function linking h to








































Steady state  0 ) ( ) ( = =
• •
t D t h establishes for D(t)=0 or for  ] ) 1 /[(
2 x n w D − = ρ .
The case D(t)=0, describes the situation where products have become completely
independent, so that it is pointless to invest further in product differentiation.
The case where  ] ) 1 /[(
2 x n w D − = ρ  describes a steady state, where a certain degree of
substitutability among products is indeed present. Notice that this solution is incomplete,
as long as x itself has to be interpreted as the steady-state value of x, which depends on the
parameters (and, in particular, negatively depends on variable D itself, according to first
order condition (16)). Moreover, appropriate conditions on parameter have to be posed, in
order to guarantee that the solution is economically meaningful and acceptable. However,
the positive direct effect of w on D is rather obvious: the higher is the investment cost, the
higher the optimal level of D, that is, the lower the optimal effort for investment in
differentiation is.
In order to find a solution for the steady-state configuration it is not sufficient to
postulate a quadratic marginal cost function c(x): in this case, a cubic equation has to be
solved, and we need further numerical constraint to find the solution analytically.
As to the economic meaning of the solution, it is worth noticing that each site
compares the costly efforts of investing in differentiation with the benefits from product
differentiation, and −in the Nash equilibrium solution concept− it chooses the optimal
amount of efforts, given the efforts of his opponents. However, because of the complete
externality from individual efforts to the degree of differentiation (which is common to all
sites), the individual effort in product-differentiation is generally under-sized as compared
to a cooperative solution. This result is common to the models on R&D investment (when
investment have positive spillovers for the rivals) or to the models on advertising (when
advertisement of a firm benefits all the competing firms as well).
In sum, a positive level of differentiation is optimal for destinations, but the efforts
in differentiation carried out by private agents are lower than the socially optimal level. As
an immediate corollary of this point, we can state that some forms of inter-destination20
coordination, or  appropriate policy interventions, are necessary to overcome the market
inefficiency implied by the public-good nature of differentiation. This point is in our
future research agenda.
8. Conclusions
In this article, we have argued that a differential model of differentiated oligopoly is
appropriate to study tourism development strategies. As a matter of fact, tourism goods
are differentiated; dynamic plans are necessary to sustain carrying capacity over time;
more importantly, competition among different destinations takes place over time.
We have taken a truly microeconomic approach, to answer up-to date questions
concerning the strategies for a sustainable development of tourism markets.
In particular, we have proposed a differential game approach to study the optimal
plans of competing tourism destinations. Our general framework permits to deal with
some specific points: (i) the determination of the time path of optimal investment in carry-
capacity; (ii) the preferability of elite vs. mass tourism, (iii) the determination of the
optimal amount of tourism flows and its interaction with product differentiation and with
the available number of products;  (iv) the optimal efforts of investment in product
differentiation.
Unfortunately, when realistic hypotheses are considered, no clear-cut and simple
suggestions emerge. In particular, our model has shown that: (i) it is not true that a elite-
tourism strategy is always associated with higher profit for destination: under some
(general) circumstances, mass-tourism can be preferable (even if high marginal cost of
production may hinder the mass development strategy); (ii) it is not true that the
introduction of new products is always beneficial to the aggregate profits of a system of
tourism destinations, even when the introduction of new products is costless; (iii) the
optimal degree of differentiation among different destinations is positive (but finite,
provided that increasing differentiation is costly); the individually optimal degree of
differentiation is generally lower than the socially optimal level. In general, an active role
of policy-making is necessary for an appropriate design of the development of the tourism
market.21
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